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HCIAL CODE 
274 
275 JUDICIAL CODE 
the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders 
and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, overt 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting froim 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencie" 
or appeals from the district court review of info 
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, eft 
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tal 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil. 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
 w (b) appeals from the district court review « | 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies?! 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, m 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts e x c e ^ j 
those from the small claims department of a C1H 
cuit court, 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court 
record m criminal cases, except those involve* 
charge of a first degree or capital felony, , 
(f) appeals from district court in crifliup 
cases, except those involving a conviction 
first degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions *°r J | 
t raordmary writs involving a criminal c0 3 
tion, except those involving a first degree or 
ta l felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving do-
mestic relations cases, including but not limited 
to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and pater-
nity, 
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any mat te r over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, m its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1988 
78-2a-4. Review of act ions b y Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
["Section 
B78-3-1 to 78-3-2 Repealed 
^78-3-3 Term of judges — Vacancy 
J78-3-4 Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals 
Repealed 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly 
£-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed 
[8-3-11 5 State District Court Administrat ive Sys-
tem — Primary and secondary county 
locations 
Repealed 
Costs of system 
Repealed 
Counties joining court system — Proce-
dure — Facilities — Salaries 
13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed 
»-14 5 Allocation of district court fees and 
fines 
15, 78-3-16 Repealed 
16 5 Fees for filing and other services or ac-
tions 
Repealed 
Application of savings accruing to coun-
ties 
Judicial Administration Act — Short ti-
tle 
Purpose of act 
Definitions 
Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Respon-
sibilities — Reports 
Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties 
Administrator of the courts — Appoint-
ment — Qualifications — Salary 
Court administrator — Powers, duties, 
and responsibilities 
Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives 
78-3-5 
8-3-6 
Section 
78-3-26 
78-3-27 
78-3-28 
78-3-29 
78-3-30 
Courts t< 
tistical 
courts 
Annual j 
Repealed 
Presiding 
Compe 
Duties of 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Rej 
78-3-3. Term of juc 
Judges of the distnc 
tially until the first g 
three years after the 
ment Thereafter, the 
district courts is six 
first Monday in Janu< 
election A judge whos 
request of the Judicia 
appointed and qualifie 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction 
cuit court 
(1) The district cour 
mat ters civil and cnm 
Constitution and not 
(2) The district cour 
dmary writs and othei 
effect their orders, ju< 
(3) Under the gener 
officer of the Judicial 
established by the J u d 
district court, which a 
jurisdiction of the circL 
the circuit court by the 
court in multiple judge 
judge in single judge c 
cases may be made up 
upon the motion of e 
When an order is made 
shall t ransmi t the plea 
court to which the ca 
court has the same j u n 
originally commenced 
appeals from final judg 
Appeals 
(4) Appeals from the 
decrees of the district c 
and 78-2a-3 
(5) The district cou 
agency adjudicative pre 
ter 46b, Title 63, and s 
ments of tha t chapter, 
cative proceedings 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Mil 
Each district court s 
seat of each county witr 
each quar ter of the year 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Rep 
78-3-11.5. State Dist 
System — I 
cations. 
(1) There is establish 
mmistra t ive System T 
minister the operation 
(2) In this chapter, "c 
District Court Adminis 
FRAUD 794 795 
Failure to comply with rules and re-
quirements. 
on must leave a posted hunting unit immedi-
>on request of a landowner or posted hunting 
ait, if that person: 
) does not have in his possession a posted 
ting unit permit; 
) endangers or has endangered human 
ty; 
i) damages or has damaged private property 
lin a posted hunting unit; or 
f) fails or has failed to comply with reason-
i rules of a landowner association. 1988 
I. Damage or destruction of property. 
son on the land of another person may not 
nally damage, disarrange, or destroy that 
property. 1988 
J. Violation of chapter — Class B misde-
meanor. 
>erson who violates any provision of this chap-
lilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless another 
is provided elsewhere in the laws of this 
1988 
4. Landowner protection under Land-
owner Liability Act. 
owners who participate in posted hunting 
hall have the full protection afforded under 
r 14, Title 57, the Limitation of Landowner 
;y Act. 1988 
TITLE 24 
tESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL 
ealed by Laws 1961, ch. 53, § 21; 1973, 
ch. 36, § 1; 1988, ch. 121, § 18.) 
TITLE 25 
FRAUD 
audulent Conveyances [Repealed]. 
le of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed]. 
ases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed]. 
irketing Wool [Repealed]. 
atute of Frauds. 
liform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16.) 
CHAPTER 2 
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK 
pealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
CHAPTER 3 
EASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK 
pealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(pealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Ml 
1. Estate or interest in real property. 
Section 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another 
— When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in 
any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or convey-
ance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 1953 
25-5-2. Wilis and implied trusts excepted. 
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be 
construed to affect the power of a testator in the dis-
position of his real estate by last will and testament; 
nor to prevent any trust from arising or being extin-
guished by implication or operation of law. 1953 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in 
lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing sub-
scribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be 
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 1953 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making of 
the agreement; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, de-
fault, or miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking 
made upon consideration of marriage, except mu-
tual promises to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor 
or administrator to answer in damages for the 
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation; 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an 
agreement by a financial institution to 
lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obli-
gation to repay money, goods, or things 
in action, to otherwise extend credit, or 
to make any other financial accommoda-
tion. "Credit agreement" does not in-
clude the usual and customary agree-
ments related to deposit accounts or 
overdrafts or other terms associated 
with deposit acco 
(ii) "Creditor" n 
tution which extei 
financial accomm( 
agreement with a 
(iii) "Debtor" n 
seeks or obtains c 
ceives a financial i 
a credit agreemen 
stitution. 
(iv) "Financial 
state or federally 
ings and loan asso 
industrial loan 
union, or any othei 
jurisdiction of the 
nancial Institution 
7, Financial Instit 
(b) A debtor or a en 
tain an action on a ere 
the agreement is in w 
sideration, sets forth th 
conditions, and is si 
against whom enforceir 
would be sought. For p 
signed application cc 
agreement, if the credit 
ily obtain an addition, 
from the debtor when j 
tion. 
(c) The following act 
to a claim that a credit i 
unless the agreement s 
ments of Subsection (b 
(i) the rendering 
by a creditor to a 
(ii) the consultati 
a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation 
tween a creditor a] 
ciary or other busi 
(d) Each credit agreei 
clearly stated typewritt 
sion giving notice to the 
ten agreement is a fin; 
agreement between the 
and the written agreeim 
tradicted by evidence ( 
agreement. The provisioi 
on the promissory note < 
indebtedness tha t is tied 
ment. 
25-5-5. Representation as to c 
son. 
To charge a person upon a repr 
credit of a third person, such repr 
Memorandum thereof, must be in 
°y the party to be charged therewi 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for 
other — When not i 
writing. 
A promise to answer for the obli 
^ y of the following cases is deem 
nation of the promisor and need 
(1) Where the promise is m 
received property of another 
mg to apply it pursuant to s 
one who has received a discha 
tion in whole or in part in co 
promise 
795 FRAUD 25-6-1 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
fii) "Creditor" means a financial insti-
tution which extends credit or extends a 
financial accommodation under a credit 
agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who 
seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or re-
ceives a financial accommodation, under 
a credit agreement with a financial in-
stitution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means a 
state or federally chartered bank, sav-
ings and loan association, savings bank, 
industrial loan corporation, credit 
union, or any other institution under the 
jurisdiction of the commissioner of Fi-
nancial Institutions as provided in Title 
7, Financial Institutions Act of 1981. 
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not main-
tain an action on a credit agreement unless 
the agreement is in writing, expresses con-
sideration, sets forth the relevant terms and 
conditions, and is signed by the party 
against whom enforcement of the agreement 
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a 
signed application constitutes a signed 
agreement, if the creditor does not customar-
lfy o6tam an additional signed' agreement 
from the debtor when granting the applica-
tion. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise 
to a claim that a credit agreement is created, 
unless the agreement satisfies the require-
ments of Subsection (b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice 
by a creditor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with 
a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose be-
tween a creditor and a debtor of fidu-
ciary or other business relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a 
clearly stated typewrit ten or printed provi-
sion giving notice to the debtor tha t the writ-
ten agreement is a final expression of the 
agreement between the creditor and debtor 
and the writ ten agreement may not be con-
tradicted by evidence of any alleged oral 
agreement. The provision does not have to be 
on the promissory note or other evidence of 
indebtedness tha t is tied to the credit agree-
ment. 1989 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third per-
son. 
To charge a person upon a representation as to the 
credit of a third person, such representation, or some 
memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed 
by the party to be charged therewith. 1953 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of an-
other — When not required to be in 
writing. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in 
any of the following cases is deemed an original obli-
gation of the promisor and need not be in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has 
received property of another upon an undertak-
ing to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by 
one who has received a discharge from an obliga-
tion in whole or in part in consideration of such 
promise. 
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or en-
ters into an obligation in consideration of the ob-
ligation in respect to which the promise is made 
i*i terms or under circumstances such as to ren-
der the party making the promise the principal 
debtor and the person in whose behalf it is made 
his surety. 
(3) Where the promise, being for an anteced-
ent obligation of another, is made upon the con-
sideration that the party receiving it cancel the 
Antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise 
As a substitute therefor; or upon the consider-
ation that the party receiving it releases the 
Property of another from a levy or his person 
from imprisonment under an execution on a judg-
ment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or 
Upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, 
whether moving from either party to the anteced-
ent obligation or from another person. 
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commis-
sion to sell merchandise and to guarantee the 
sale. 
(5) When the holder of an ins t rument for the 
Payment of money upon which a third person is 
°r may become liable to him transfers it in pay-
ment of a precedent debt of his own, or for a new 
consideration, and in connection with such t rans-
fer enters into a promise respecting such instru-
ment. 1953 
25-5->. Contracts by te legraph deemed written. 
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be 
contracts in writing, and all communications sent by 
te legr a ph and signed by the person sending the same, 
o r
 by his authority, shall be deemed to be communica-
tions
 m writing. 1953 
25-5-§. Right to specific performance not af-
fected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be con-
strue^ to abridge the powers of courts to compel the 
specific performance of agreements in case of par t 
performance thereof. 1953 
25-5-ty. Agent may sign for principal. 
Ev^jy instrument required by the provisions of this 
chapter to be subscribed by any party may be sub-
scribed by the lawful agent of such party. 1953 
CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. Short title. 
25-6-3. Definitions. 
25-6-3. Insolvency. 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising be-
fore or after transfer. 
25-6-§. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising be-
fore transfer. 
25-6-?. Transfer — When made. 
25-6-3. Remedies of creditors. 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits. 
25-6-1.1. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
25-6-12. Construction of chapter. 
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter. 
25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act." 
Edward T. Wells - 3422 
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES 
323 South 600 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 538-0700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL S. HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C87-7595 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
t-n 1rf 
w?o 
/ 
l7fl 
This case came on for trial before this Court, the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge, presiding, on 
September 20, 1988. The plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, was represented 
by Edward T. Wells of the firm of J. H. Bottum & Associates, and 
the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was represented by Michael H. 
Wray. The Court heard evidence, received exhibits and entertained 
the arguments of counsel. 
As to plaintiff's claims against the defendant, the Court 
hereby enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about October 15, 1986, the plaintiff, Jerry 
Spicer, at the request of the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, 
1 
provided to Mr. Hughes for his benefit the sum of Eleven Thousand 
Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80). 
2. Said money was given at the request of the 
defendant, Michael S. Hughes. 
3. At the time the money was given to Hughes by Spicer, 
United States Savings & Trust (hereinafter "USS&T"), a corporation, 
owed the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, sums of money relating to 
stock purchases by USS&T and for a finder's fee. 
4. The money paid by the plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to 
the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was not intended as a loan, but 
was repayment for past consideration furnished by the defendant to 
USS&T. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The defendant is entitled to judgment against the 
plaintiff for no cause of action. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL S. HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C-87-7595 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
September 20, 1988 
9:00 a.m. 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff 
For the Defendant: 
Edward T. Wells 
J. H. Bottum & Associates 
323 South 600 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Michael Wray 
Attorney at Law 
1061 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, utah 84106 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL 
Registered Professional Reporter 
240 East 4th South - A304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1 respect to the fact that has been represented by defendant, 
2 that is true. I did speak with him last week. I spoke 
3 with Mr. Spicer and he had every intention of coming 
4 when I spoke to him. 
5 When he called me yesterday morning r this is 
5 something that apparently flared up again over the weekend, 
7 and he was not aware in time to get any kind of alternative 
S transportation and get here. 
9 THE COURT: Where is he? 
1Q MR. WELLS: In Florida. 
Ij THE COURT: 0h r Florida. The motion for 
•2 a continuance will be denied. The motion — the other 
13 motions will be taken under advisement. 
1 4 MR. WELLS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: We can proceed. 
There is in the file a confusing pleading. 
I think maybe this was your secretary r Mr. Wellsr who 
13 I may have typed the wrong caption on the case and it has 
19 gotten in the wrong file as a result. But I don't see 
20 what it has to do — 
2| MR. WELLS: This is the other matter r 
22 and I think that's what happened. W e had two files in 
23 the office^ and my gal got the wrong heading on it. 
24 THE COURT: That shouldn't be in there. 
25 MR. WELLS: That should be in the other 
5 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
1986? 
A 
Q 
by whom were ; 
A 
Q 
to October of 
in Texas with 
a repayment? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Texas who had 
A 
Q 
under an obli< 
4388 Emigration Canyon Road. 
How old are you? 
32. 
What is your profession? 
I'm a stockbroker. 
What was your profession in October of 
I was a stockbroker. 
Calling your attention to October of 1986, 
you employed at that time? 
Equity-One Corporation. 
Okay. And again calling your attention 
1986, did you at that time have a problem 
a rescission which required you to make 
Yes. 
And was the sum of that repayment $11,221.80? 
No. It was $11,000. 
Even? 
Yes. 
And this was apparently to persons in 
purchased stock from you? 
Yes, it was. 
And as a result of that problem you were 
jation to repay that money? 
10 
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2 
3 
4 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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15 
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25 
A 
to do it. 
hear the last 
Yes, I was. Not an obligation; I chose 
THE COURT: I beg your pardon? I didn't 
: statement. 
THE WITNESS: I chose to do it. I wasn't 
under an obligation. I chose to do it. 
Q 
to make that 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
for you, you 
have you? 
A 
Q 
Exhibit No. P 
(By Mr. Wells) And you asked Mr. Spicer 
payment for you, didn't you? 
I certainly did. 
And he in fact made that payment for you? 
Yes, he did. 
And since the time that he made that payment 
have not repaid any of that money to him, 
Heavens no. 
I hand you what's been marked as plaintiff's 
-24, which is a letter that was shown to 
you in your deposition in this matter. I will ask you 
if you recognize that letter. 
A 
Q 
to you on or 
A 
Q 
law firm that 
Yes, I do. 
And was that letter in fact delivered 
about the date thereof? 
Yes, it was. 
And you made no response to either the 
. sent the letter or to Mr. Spicer with respect 
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BY MR. WRAY; 
Q 
THE 
Mr. 
COURT: Mr. Wray. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Hughes, did you feel it was appropriate 
that you respond in writing to a demand from — 
A 
Q 
Mr. Wells, thi 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
you and Mr. Sp 
A 
Your Honor. 
BY MR. WELLS: 
Q 
did he not? 
A 
Q 
A 
No, 
At i 
I did not. 
any time did you borrow money from 
s $11,000, at any time? 
From Mr. Wells? 
I'm 
No, 
Was 
icer 
No, 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
He < 
sorry, Mr. Spicer. 
I did not. 
there ever any communication between 
about a loan of $11,000 or $11,228? 
there was not. 
WRAY: I have no further questions, 
COURT: Anything further, Mr. Wells? 
WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
3id make that payment on your behalf, 
He absolutely did. 
And 
You 
you asked him to make it? 
bet I did. 
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not in evidence any writing that shows, number one,, that 
any of these transactions involved Mr. Spicer as the 
purchaser. And number two, that Mr. Spicer ever agreed 
in writing to stand good for any of these transactions. 
And that's the whole problem with this defense, Your 
Honor, is that it's all precluded by the statute of frauds. 
THE COURT: Well, let's let Mr. Wray proceed 
here. I want to ask you one more question before he 
does, Mr. Hughes. 
EXAMINATION BY THE COURT 
Q I know this is a long time ago, a couple 
of years, but as I understand the testimony, you called 
Mr. Spicer on the phone and asked him — or told him 
to pay this $11,000 for you; is that right? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. Now, I know it's been a long time, 
but as near as you can recall, tell me what he said and 
what you said. 
Let me ask you this first: When was it, about? 
A October of '86. 
Q 1986. And it was a telephone call? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you call him or did he call you? 
A I called him at U.S.S.&T. In an office 
there. 
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Q Was anyone else on the line? 
A Not at the time. 
Q Was there anyone else in your office or 
in his office that could have overheard part of the 
conversation? 
A There was someone on my phone. My partner, 
Jeff Vanos. 
Q He heard your half of it? 
A Yes, he did. He heard Jerry's half of 
it, too. He was on the telephone with us. 
Q Oh. 
A As a matter of fact, every conversation 
I had with Jerry Spicer, because of what had happened, 
I had Jeff Vanos listen to every single — 
THE COURT: Vanos? V-A-N-O-S. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (By the Court) As near as you can remember, 
tell me what you said to him and what he said to you? 
A I said, "Jerry, I have to have something 
paid to the State of Texas, or to Mr. Zwerner, in order 
to preclude going to the State of Texas. It has to be 
done today. It's $11,000. And I need to get it done." 
And he said he would do it. 
Q Exactly what were his words? Do you remember 
what he said? 
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A He said he would do it. He would take 
care of it. "What's the address?" 
Q Okay. 
A And he sent a courier. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions 
on that particular conversation before he moves on, either 
of you? 
MR. WELLS: No. 
MR. WRAY: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WRAY: 
Q Do you know where Mr. Spicer was located 
at the time this conversation occurred? 
A I called him at U.S.S.&T., United States 
Savings & Trust. 
Q Do you know what city in Texas? 
A Dallas, Texas. 
Q So you phoned Mr. Spicer in the Dallas, 
Texas offices of U.S.S.&T? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what the term alter-ego means? 
A I think I know what it is. 
MR. WELLS: I'll object to his opinion 
about that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, sustained. 
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Wray, » 
Q 
MR. 
(By 
existence of a $10 
that 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes 
Has 
No. 
Is : 
WRAY: All 
Mr. Wray) 
,000 finder' 
• 
the finder1 
It possible 
right. 
You testified as to 
s fee. 
s fee been paid? 
the 
that the $11,000 transaction 
we discussed previously was in fact payment l 
a finder1s fee? 
is possible. 
that 
into 
that 
MR. 
THE 
WELLS: I'm going to object to 
Eor 
what 
COURT: Sustained. He's testifying 
it hasn't been paid. 
Q 
evidence 
occurred 
office in the 
that 
MR. 
(By 
some 
from 
WRAY: Well 
Mr. Wray) 
.r swell. 
Mr. Hughesr we have 
documents indicating 
the offices i of U.S.S. 
entered 
a transaction 
&T to another 
amount of $11,000. Can you tell us 
transaction was about? 
A 
what 
I had a rescission in Texas that was paid 
by that transaction. 
Q 
A 
Was 
No, 
MR. 
it a loan? 
it was not. 
WELLS : I • ir  going to object to his 
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conclusions without a foundation. 
understanding. 
Q 
any terms for 
A 
Q 
A 
was no loan. 
Q 
efforts? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
THE COURT: Overruled. He stated his 
(By Mr. Wray) Were there any — ever 
repayment of that $11,000? 
No. 
By you or by anyone else? 
By no one. There were no terms. There 
Did Mr. Spicer make any other collection 
No, he did not. 
Pardon me. 
No, he did not. 
Was there ever any communication after 
that transaction about repayment? 
A 
there was none 
Q 
A 
28, 1987. 
Q 
or ten years, 
A 
Q 
Until I got the letter from Mr. Wells, 
:. 
And that was approximately how long ago? 
I guess that was October. It was October 
Is that approximately a week or a year 
or how long ago? 
A year. 
So for a period of a year there is not 
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any communication about this transaction between you — 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
questions of 
recess before 
be in recess 
Absolutely not. 
Have you ever felt it was a loan? 
No. 
Do you feel today it's a loan? 
No. 
Did you feel at the time it was a loan? 
No. 
MR. WRAY: Your Honor, I have no further 
this witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wells: 
MR. WELLS: Yes, I do have a few. 
THE COURT: Maybe we'll take a five minutes 
you start your cross examination. We'll 
for about five minutes. 
(Morning recess) 
BY MR. WELLS: 
Q 
you asked Mr. 
was some need 
A 
Q 
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Wells. 
MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
It's true, is it not, that at the time 
Spicer to take care of this for you there 
to move quickly? 
Uh huh. (Indicating affirmative) 
You told him there was a time problem 
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and you needed to get the check there that day? 
A Yes. 
Q And so this was a way for you in Salt 
Lake of getting a check delivered to Texas that day, 
was to have Mr. Spicer take care of it for you? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q And you in fact told him that there was 
a time problem, it had to be done that day? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Now, with respect to this finder's fee, 
I believe you testified that you were introduced to Mr. 
Spicer as president of CITRAM; is that correct? 
A I was introduced to him as Jerry Spicer. 
He ended up being the president of CITRAM. 
1 Q He is the president of CITRAM, and CITRAM 
was looking for a partner. 
A Yes, they were. 
Q And you were going to act on behalf of 
them to put them together with somebody that could merge 
with them? 
A Sort of the other way around. I represented 
the Gold Hold people and found CITRAM for them. 
Q So you were representing the other side 
of the deal and putting them together with CITRAM? 
A No. When they came to me I was representing 
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that I knew some of these people who were in fact looking 
for those merger opportunities. 
Q 
A 
them put one 
Q 
about? 
A 
Q 
you help me 
A 
Q 
partner for 
A 
Okay. 
They came to me, asked me if I could help 
! together, and I said yes. 
And when you say "they," who are you talking 
Jerry Spicer and Bill Windsor. 
And Mr. Spicer came to you and said, "can 
put together a merger for CITRAM"? 
Yes. 
And you said, "Yes, I can get a merger 
CITRAM"? 
No. I said, "I will try and find someone 
who could help him to — 
Q 
help CITRAM 
A 
Q 
together yor 
A 
Q 
You were going to find somebody who would 
get a merger put together? 
Yes. 
And for your fees for putting that merger 
i were going to get a finder's fee? 
Yes, I was. 
And that finder's fee would be paid to 
you if the merger came about? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it was. 
And was to be paid to you for in fact 
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helping to bring the merger about? 
A Yes. 
Q That was something CITRAM wanted you to 
do and something that the other corporation wanted you 
to do? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you going to get a finder's fee from 
each side? 
A No, I was not. 
Q Which side of the deal was responsible 
for the finder's fee? 
A Jerry Spicer was. 
Q So that would have been the CITRAM side 
of the deal? 
A Yes. 
Q And so CITRAM was going to pay you a finder's 
fee if you could find a suitable merger partner? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything 
I in writing that said that if CITRAM didn't pay that fee 
that he would pay it to you personally? 
A No, he did not. 
MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm 
going to move to strike all the testimony regarding the 
supposed finder's fee on the basis of the statute of 
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frauds, because he has just testified that Mr. Spicer 
never agreed personally to assume that. He's testified 
that it was a finder's fee from CITRAM which was to be 
paid upon the completion of a successful merger. And 
apparently this merger came about and the fee is owed 
by CITRAM. But there is no evidence that Mr. Spicer 
in fact ever agreed to be personally responsible for 
that. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I think even if 
it's not legally collectible it goes to the issue of 
what the $11,000 transaction was all about, and therefore, 
the motion to strike will be denied. 
MR. WELLS: Well, Your Honor, the statute 
does say that it cannot be used as a defense. 
THE COURT: I understand that. But in 
this particular instance it's not being used as a setoff, 
it is being used to explain the purpose of the $11,000 
transaction, and the motion is denied. 
Anything further. 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Wells) Now, you have previously 
testified regarding the telephone conversation. 
A Yes. 
Q Is there anything else you can remember 
about that conversation that you haven't told us? 
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Q That's a corporation. 
A Yes, it is* 
Q Have you ever received from Mr. Spicer 
anything in writing wherein he agreed to personally pay 
any debts owed to you by that corporation? 
A No. Of course not. 
MR. WELLS: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wray, anything further. 
MR. WRAY: Your Honor, I have nothing 
further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Do you 
have any more witnesses, Mr. Wray? 
MR. WRAY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses. 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 
that would be appropriate, and we do have some rebuttal 
testimony from Mr. Spicer. 
And as I indicated to the court earlier, because 
of his health problems he is unable to be here. I would 
move that the court allow the case to remain open to 
a later date when we can have Mr. Spicer appear and testify, 
THE COURT: That motion was taken under 
advisement earlier. After having heard the testimony, 
I think my inclination is to deny that motion. 
This matter was continued once. Mr. Spicer 
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1 did have an opportunity to be here, and I think today 
2 is the day set for trial. I would anticipate that if 
3 he were here he would say that he had a different under-
4 standing than Mr. Hughes, and there may be some differences 
5 in his testimony, but I don't think that the nature of 
6 the case is such that it would be unfair to not allow 
7 him to testify. And based upon that, the motion is denied. 
3 Do you have a closing statement to make, Mr. 
9 Wells? 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. Before I 
11 I do that, though, I would once again move to strike all 
12 of the testimony of Mr. Hughes relating to monies owed 
13 to him by CITRAM as a finder's fee and by U.S.S.&T for 
14 whatever reason on the grounds that those debts are not 
15 material to the issues of this lawsuit. They are not 
16 relevant to the issues of this lawsuit. And the question 
17 before the court is whether or not Mr. Jerry Spicer had 
18 an antecedent debt personally owing to the defendant 
19 which could have been used as an offset for the amounts 
20 loaned and advanced on his behalf by Mr. Spicer and as 
2| shown by the testimony. 
22 The statute of frauds precludes any consideration 
23 by the court of debts owing to Mr. Hughes by either of 
24 the corporations because of the fact that there is no 
25 evidence of a writing, as required by the statute of 
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1 frauds. And so I would therefore move the court that 
2 all of the testimony relating to debts owed to the 
3 defendant by any corporate entity be stricken at this 
4 time, 
5 THE COURT: I will take that under advisement 
6 for a few moments, I will let you continue with your 
7 closing argument, 
8 MR, WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 I As I indicated. Your Honor, this is a relatively 
10 simple case. If the court will recall the testimony, 
11 and specifically when the court was inquiring of Mr. 
12 Hughes with respect to the conversation he had with Mr. 
13 Spicer at the time that he needed this money paid in 
14 Texas, he testified that he called and ask Jerry if he 
15 would pay that money for him, and Jerry~said yes. 
15 I think it is very — I guess telling is a 
17 good word that with respect to the claim of the defendant 
18 he did not claim that in that conversation he said to 
19 Jerry, you can take care of the monies you owe me, or 
20 this will take care of the finder's fee, or this will 
21 take care of anything else, 
22 He said nothing in that conversation which 
23 would have indicated to Mr. Spicer that he was asking 
24 him to repay an amount previously owed to him. 
25 If you will recall, he testified that he called 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (j). This case is an appeal 
from the District Court and has been transferred to the Court of 
Appeal from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Defendant had an implied duty at law to repay 
monies paid for his benefit and at his request by the Plaintiff. 
2. The Statute of Frauds precluded evidence and 
findings of an agreement by Plaintiff to repay money owed to 
Defendant by USS&T Corporation or to cover losses to Defendant 
caused by third parties. 
3. The Trial Court's findings number 3 and 4 and the 
Judgment are not supported by the evidence. 
4. The Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing 
to hold the case open to receive Plaintiff's testimony. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2): 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was commenced by Jerry Spicer filing a 
complaint against Michael Hughes to collect the sum of Eleven 
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents 
1 
($11,221.80) from Mr. Hughes. Plaintiff claimed that Hughes asked 
him by telephone to loan him money to take care of an obligation 
in Dallas, Texas which required payment of $11,000.00 on the date 
of the phone call. Plaintiff, as a friendly accommodation, made 
the payment on behalf of Defendant and when Defendant did not 
return the money and pay the expenses upon demand, suit was filed. 
The suit alleged that money was loaned to Defendant and repayment 
was refused. Defendant claimed no loan was made and no obligation 
of repayment existed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Bench Trial was held on September 20, 1988, after the 
Court refused to grant a Motion for Continuance due to illness of 
Plaintiff who was unable to travel to Utah from Florida for the 
trial. The Trial Court also refused to allow the testimony of 
Plaintiff to be taken subsequently. The Court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and awarded judgment in favor of 
Defendant dismissing the action. A timely notice of appeal was 
filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Michael Hughes testified that in October of 
1986 he was working for Equity One Corporation and he had a 
rescission problem in Texas which required him to make an 
$11,000.00 payment TR:10. Hughes stated he had an obligation to 
repay the $11,000.00 TR:10-11. Hughes testified he asked the 
Plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to make the payment on his behalf. 
TR:11. He further admitted he had never repaid Spicer for making 
the payment on his behalf. Id. See also TR:16, Ln. 21-25. 
2 
Mr. Hughes testified specifically as to the telephone 
call wherein he asked Plaintiff to advance the money on his 
behalf. He stated: 
I said, "Jerry, I have to have something paid to the 
State of Texas, or to Mr. Zwerner, in order to preclude 
going to the State of Texas. It has to be done today. 
It's $11,000.00 and I need to get it done." and he said 
he would do it. TR:23, Ln. 19-23. 
Mr. Spicer was in Dallas, Texas at the time. TR:24, Ln. 12-17. 
Exhibit D-12 is the check paid to Mr. Zwerner on behalf 
of Mr. Hughes by Mr. Spicer. 
While Mr. Hughes testified there were never any agreed 
terms for the repayment (TR:42) he did testify that the money was 
paid by Mr. Spicer at his request, to fulfill his personal 
obligation. TR:10-11. 
Mr. Hughes admitted that his purpose in asking Spicer, 
who was in Dallas, Texas, to take care of a money problem was that 
he had to move quickly. The testimony of Mr. Hughes is 
enlightening as to what occurred. 
Q It's true, is it not, that at the time you asked 
Mr. Spicer to take care of this (the money problem) 
for you there was some need to move quickly? 
A Uh huh. (Indicating affirmative) 
Q You told him there was a time problem and you 
needed to get the check there that day. 
A Yes. 
Q And so this was a way for you in Salt Lake of 
getting a check delivered to Texas that day, was to 
have Mr. Spicer take care of it for you. 
A Yes, it was. 
TR:43-44 
3 
At the close of testimony, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
allow rebuttal testimony to be taken at a later date from Mr. 
Spicer who was unable to attend the trial due to illness, TR:49 
No claim was made and no evidence was introduced to show 
that the money paid on behalf of Mr. Hughes by Plaintiff was a 
gift or that anyone considered it a gift. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in granting judgment to 
Defendant in this case. The unrefuted testimony of Defendant was 
that he requested Plaintiff to help him handle an emergency in 
which he was involved that required a payment of $11,000.00 to be 
made immediately in Texas. Defendant's own description of events 
was that he had to make a payment in Texas on the date he made a 
call to Mr. Spicer in Texas to ask for his help. TR:23, 43-44. 
He asked Spicer as a friend to help him solve the problem Jd and 
as a friend Spicer did so by paying the amount due from his own 
funds. See Ex. D-12. 
Thus the only evidence in the record shows conclusively 
the following as true: 
1. Hughes had a debt to be paid immediately in Dallas, 
Texas. 
2. Hughes was in Salt Lake City. 
3. Hughes called Spicer in Dallas and asked him if he 
could help him out by paying the amount due in Dallas. 
4. Spicer said yes and made the payment on behalf of 
Hughes. 
4 
The Court made the following findings of fact with 
respect to the above items: 
Finding 1. On or about October 15, 198 6, the Plaintiff, 
Jerry Spicer, at the request of the Defendant, Michael S.Hughes, 
provided to Mr. Hughes for his benefit the sum of Eleven Thousand 
Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80). 
Finding 2. Said money was given at the request of the 
Defendant, Michael S. Hughes. 
Under the said evidence it is clear there was a loan to Hughes 
which he has either a legal or equitable duty to repay. 
If there was any question regarding the above facts and 
the fact that a loan was made, it was then error for the trial 
judge to refuse to hold the case open to receive the testimony of 
Mr. Spicer. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
DEFENDANT HAD AN IMPLIED DUTY AT LAW TO REPAY MONIES 
PAID FOR HIS BENEFIT AND AT HIS REQUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
At common law, a party had the right to bring an action 
in assumpsit to recover money paid on behalf of another to a third 
party. The general rule is that if one pays money to a third 
party for the use or benefit of another at such person's express 
or implied request, he can recover the money so paid from such 
other person. It has been held the law implies a promise to repay 
in such a case. The old assumpsit rule appears to be universally 
accepted today. See e. g. Minskv's Follies of Florida v. Serines, 
5 
206 F.2d 1,4 (5th Cir. 1953); Sommer v. Nakdimen. 97 F.2d 715, 721 
(8th Cir. 1938); Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 57 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1932) Cert. den. 287 U.S. 646 
(1933); Roussel v. Russel, 339 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. 1959); Kennedy 
v. Conrad, 9 Mont. 356, 9 P.2d 1075, 1078, (1932). 
In the Roussell case, supra, the Court stated: 
The rule is that where one pays out money at the special 
instance and request of another, the law implies a promise on 
the part of the latter to repay it. 339 P.2d at 527. 
In the Kennedy case, supra, the Court stated: 
...[I]t is not necessary to sustain Plaintiff's right of 
recovery that there be an express promise on the part of 
defendants to repay the value of the casing; for the 
rule is that, "where one pays out money at the special 
instance and request of another, the law implies a 
promise on the part of the latter to repay it.11 9 P. 2d 
at 1078 (citations omitted). 
Thus it is clear from the cases and the evidence that Defendant 
Hughes had a duty to repay the monies advanced on his behalf by 
Mr. Spicer in the sum of $11,221.80 which consisted of the 
$11,000.00 plus expenses incurred in delivering the money of 
$221.80. 
Point II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDED EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF 
AN AGREEMENT BY PLAINTIFF TO REPAY MONEY OWED TO DEFENDANT BY 
USS&T CORPORATION OR TO COVER LOSSES TO DEFENDANT CAUSED BY THIRD 
PARTIES. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2), as part of the 
Utah Statute of Frauds, precludes enforcement of a contract to 
answer for the debt of a third party absent a writing. 
6 
Mr. Hughes testified he was owed a finder's fee by 
Citram Corporation. As of the date of tricil, such fee had not 
been paid by Citram Corporation. TR:41 at 6-7. Hughes testified 
on cross examination that he was owed the finder's fee in a 
merger. TR:45, Ln. 19-24. Hughes testified Spicer was an officer 
of Citram Corporation, which corporation owed the finder's fee. 
TR:46. Hughes specifically testified as follows: 
Q and so Citram was going to pay you a finder's fee 
if you could find a suitable merger partner? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything in 
writing that said if Citram didn't pay that fee 
that he would pay it to you personally? 
A No, he did not. 
TR:46, Ln. 16-22. 
Objection was properly made to all testimony of Mr. 
Hughes as to debts of third parties for which he claimed Mr. 
Spicer was responsible (see TR:21, 46-47) and proper motions to 
strike such testimony were made. See TR:46-47, 50-51. The motion 
was overruled TR:47. 
Clearly it is improper to allow such testimony. 
Findings number 3 and 4 that USS&T owed money to Hughes 
and that the money paid by Spicer on behalf of Hughes was a 
repayment of such amounts were apparently based upon such evidence 
even though such evidence is clearly precluded by the Statute of 
Frauds. 
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Point III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NUMBER 3 AND 4 AND THE 
JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Court as part of its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made the following factual findings numbered 3 
and 4 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
3. At the time the money was given to Hughes by 
Spicer, United States Savings & Trust (hereinafter "USS&T"), a 
corporation of which Spicer was an officer, owed the Defendant, 
Michael S. Hughes, sums of money relating to stock purchases by 
USS&T and for a finder's fee. 
4. The money paid by the Plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to 
the Defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was not intended as a loan, but 
was repayment for past consideration furnished by the Defendant to 
USS&T. 
Based upon findings 3 and 4, the court concluded in its 
conclusion of law as follows: 
The Defendant is entitled to judgment against the 
Plaintiff for no cause of action. 
Such a judgment was then entered. 
Nowhere in the transcript do we have any competent 
admissable evidence that supports the conclusion that the money 
advanced personally by Jerry spicer to pay the debt of Michael 
Hughes was intended by the parties to repay debts owed to Hughes 
by third parties or indeed that such moneys were owed to Hughes by 
Mr. Spicer. The statute of frauds precludes evidence that such 
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was the case. The statute specifically provides that proof of an 
agreement to pay debts of third parties which is not in writing 
cannot be used as a defense. Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4. 
The defense of Hughes was that he was entitled to offset moneys 
owed to Spicer by him against money owed to him by third persons 
associated with Spicer. The purpose of the statute is to preclude 
the very situation we have in this case. Spicer advances money at 
the request of Hughes (Findings of Fact 1 and 2). Nothing is said 
by Hughes at the time he makes the request of Spicer that Hughes 
considers the money advanced to be repayment of obligations owed 
to him by third parties (see TR: 22-24, 47, Ln. 24 through 48, 
Ln. 9) and then when Spicer seeks his legal remedy to recover for 
the money advanced, Hughes says in effect flI don't owe anything, 
I set off what you owed against what I was owed by these third 
parties (USS&T). 
Such testimony is barred by the Statute of Frauds. The 
Court erred in admitting such testimony. The Court erred in 
denying the motion to strike such testimony. See TR:4 6-47. 
It is certainly error to base findings 3 and 4 on such 
testimony. Without the erroneously admitted testimony, there is 
no testimony to support findings 3 and 4 and without findings 3 
and 4 the Judgment and conclusion of law have no basis in the 
record and were erroneously entered. 
Point IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
HOLD THE CASE OPEN TO RECEIVE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY. 
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Having denied Plaintiff's Motion to continue the trial 
due to the inability of Plaintiff to attend for medical reasons 
(TR:5), it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow the case 
to remain open to allow rebuttal testimony from Mr. Spicer. 
The evidence adduced from the mouth of the Defendant in 
this case clearly shows, for the reasons set forth in Point I 
above, and in the Court's findings numbered 1 and 2, that 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant the amounts 
advanced for him by the Plaintiff. 
The Court, however, proceeded to allow defendant to 
testify, over objection, as to numerous unrelated transactions 
involving third parties who were not parties to the litigation, 
wherein defendant claimed debts were owed to him by such third 
parties. The Court then, over objection, allowed defendant to 
testify that he considered that Spicer "owed him" for his losses 
in dealing with these third parties and that he was entitled to 
offset what the third parties owed him against the amounts 
advanced by Spicer to pay his debt. 
Having allowed such testimony and denied a motion to 
strike all such testimony (TR:46-47) the Court then refused to 
allow the case to remain open to allow rebuttal from Mr. Spicer. 
TR:49-50. 
The trial was to the Court. Defense made no claim of 
any detriment were the motion to be granted. Under the 
circumstances, counsel respectfully suggests that the refusal to 
allow the record to be supplemented with Plaintiff's testimony was 
an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, premises considered, counsel respectfully 
suggests that as a matter of law, as set forth in Point I, 
Plaintiff was and is entitled to judgment against Mr. Hughes for 
$11,221.80 plus interest at the statutory rate until paid; that 
the Court erred in holding the money paid on behalf of Hughes by 
Spicer was intended as repayment of debts owed to Hughes by third 
persons; and that the Judgment of the District Court should be 
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to vacate the 
Judgment and to enter judgment for Plaintiff as prayed for in the 
Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted this j^/^ay of November, 1989. 
Edward T 
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellant 
/ Wells 
11 
